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Civil Procedure. Burns v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 743 A.2d 566 (R.I. 2000). Plaintiff brought suit against his
disability insurance company for wrongful termination of benefits.
He further sued his insurance agent alleging negligence resulting
in the termination of his benefits. The court dismissed the case
against the insurance agent as barred by the statute of limitations
under Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-14.1. The court then
entered a final judgment in favor of the insurance company as a
sanction against the plaintiff for failing to abide by court-ordered
discovery and for making misrepresentations to the court as to the
existence of the requested material pursuant to Rhode Island Su-
perior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 37 (b)(2)(C).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Burns v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,' the plain-
tiff, Mr. Alan F. Burns (Burns) originally brought suit arguing that
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company (Conn. Mutual)
wrongfully terminated his benefits from a disability policy issued
on October 4, 1988.2 Burns further alleged that his insurance
salesman, H. Randell Howard (Howard), was negligent in not in-
forming Burns that he was ineligible for the disability insurance
when it was issued.3 The superior court dismissed both causes of
action.4 Burns then appealed the superior court's dismissal of his
claim against Howard due to the running of the statute of limita-
tions pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-14.1. 5
Burns further appealed the dismissal of his claim against Conn.
1. 743 A.2d 566 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 567.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. Section 9-1-14.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws states, in perti-
nent part:
Limitations on Malpractice Actions.
Not withstanding the provisions of §§ 9-1-13 and 9-1-14, an action for
medical, veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent or
broker malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the
time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action; pro-
vided, however, that:
(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical, veterina-
rian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent malpractice which
could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the
time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit
shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts
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Mutual under Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure
37 (b)(2)(C) 6 for his failure to comply with court ordered discovery
in a timely manner, and deliberately deceiving the court as to the
existence of the documents requested by Conn. Mutual.7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Statute of Limitations
On August 26, 1988, Burns consulted with Howard for the
purchase of a disability insurance policy that was subsequently is-
sued on October 4, 1988.8 The October 4th policy contained nu-
merous errors as to Burns' criminal record, earned income,
severity of previous injuries and his physical job duties.9 Despite
wording on the front of the policy stating "READ YOUR POLICY
CAREFULLY" and a statement telling the insured that the policy
is issued based upon the information contained on the application
form (which was attached to the policy), Burns contended that
Howard is responsible for the misinformation.10 Burns further ar-
gued that he first became aware of the errors in 1993.11 Burns
commenced his action against Howard on June 7, 1993.12
On appeal, Burns contended that the statute of limitations as
laid out in Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-14.1 should
start to run at the time he was first aware of Howard's alleged
negligence in 1993 and not at the actual occurrence in 1988.13 The
supreme court upheld the motion justice's determination that the
of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have
been discovered.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
6. Rule 37 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent
part:
An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or a final judgment dismissing the ac-
tion or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party.
R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
7. See Burns, 743 A.2d at 568.
8. See id. at 567.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
60920011
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three-year statute of limitations began October 4, 1988.14 Both
courts believed that with minimal effort Burns would have been
aware of any errors in his policy when he first received it.15
Dismissal Under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b)(2)(C)
Burns also appealed the superior court's entry of final judg-
ment against him for untimely compliance with the court ordered
discovery. 16 Burns contended "that dismissal was a drastic rem-
edy, unsuited to his alleged misconduct .... 17 The court dis-
agreed and pointed to the inconsistency between Burns' testimony
that the requested records were destroyed when his computer hard
drive stopped working and his wife's deposition testimony that
there existed a file cabinet full of potentially relevant documents.',
The supreme court acknowledged the harshness of the penalty but
affirmed the propriety of the action. 19
CONCLUSION
When a plaintiff has reasonable notice of potential damages
from another's negligence, the statute of limitations will start to
run from the moment the complaining party should reasonably
have known of the negligent act and not necessarily when the al-
leged negligent act is actually discovered. Further, entrance of a
final judgment against a party pursuant to Rhode Island Superior
Court Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) is an appropriate out-
come when a party has misrepresented the existence of informa-
tion requested in discovery.
Christopher A. Anderson
14. See id. at 567-68.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 568.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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Civil Procedure. Mark v. Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh, 745
A.2d 777 (R.I. 2000). Plaintiffs in their individual capacities and
as co-executors of the decedent's estate brought this action against
the defendant religious organization and defendant cemetery oper-
ator seeking punitive damages for the sale of decedent's grave
sites. Defendant religious organization moved to strike plaintiffs'
claims for punitive damages. The superior court denied the motion
and defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court. In its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court con-
fined the holding of Palmisano v. Toth' to its specific facts, and
determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary unless a
plaintiff makes an inquiry into the health of defendant's finances.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1967, an alleged contract was created between Haskel Mark
(decedent) and defendant Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh (Congre-
gation).2 This contract was for the purchase of two cemetery plots
in Lincoln Cemetery in Warwick.3 Plaintiff Harold Mark (Harold
or plaintiff) contends that from 1967 through 1992, the decedent
paid a fee for care of these two gravesites to Chased Schell Amess
Association (Association), the Association that operates the ceme-
tery.4 Upon the decedent's death in 1992, Harold contacted the As-
sociation to arrange an opening of one of the plots.5 In his attempt
to make that arrangement, Harold discovered the plot had been
resold by the Congregation in 1991.6 Because decedent had to be
buried expeditiously due to his religious beliefs, an alternate site
was purchased by the Mark family outside the Congregation's des-
ignated area. 7
Plaintiffs filed suit on July 22, 1994, naming both the Congre-
gation and the Association as defendants" During the pending lit-
igation, Marion Mark, the decedent's widow, passed away and was
buried next to her husband at the alternative gravesite. 9 Subse-
1. 624 A.2d 314 (R.I. 1993).
2. See Mark v. Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh, 745 A.2d 777, 778 (R.I. 2000).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 778-79.
8. See id. at 779.
9. See id.
20011
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quently, defendant Congregation filed a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on certain claims asserted by plaintiffs, which was
denied without prejudice by the motion justice with regard to the
plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages on October 21, 1998.10 A
subsequent motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages
was made by defendant Congregation on October 21, 1998.11 This
motion was denied. 12 The motion justice ruled that the defendant
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to strike in
accordance with Palmisano; because plaintiff made no effort to dis-
cover defendant's financial assets, there was no right to a hear-
ing.13 On January 7, 1999, the Congregation's petition for writ of
certiorari was granted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 14
BACKGROUND
The severe restrictions of punitive damages under Rhode Is-
land law are well-established. In Palmisano, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court enunciated that a "party seeking punitive damages
has the burden of producing 'evidence of such willfulness, reckless-
ness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amounts]
to criminality, which for the good of society and warning to the in-
dividual, ought to be punished.'""5 Additionally, the standard in
Rhode Island for the imposition of punitive damages is:
rigorous and will be satisfied only in instances wherein a de-
fendant's conduct requires deterrence and punishment over
and above that provided in an award of compensatory dam-
age. An award of punitive damages is considered an ex-
traordinary sanction and is disfavored in the law, but it will
be permitted if awarded with great caution and within nar-
row limits.16
Furthermore, the trial justice is responsible for determining
whether the party seeking punitive damages has met this stan-
dard for an award of punitive damages once that standard has
been met within the discretion of the fact finder "to determine
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Palmisano, 624 A.2d at 318 (quoting Sherman v. McDermott, 329 A.2d
195, 196 (1974)).
16. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
whether and to what extent punitive damages should be
awarded."17
The Palmisano court, however, recognized the burden that dis-
covery of personal finances places on the defendant against whom
punitive damages are sought.18 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court promulgated a rule which requires a plaintiff to "make a
prima facie showing that a viable claim exists for the award of pu-
nitive damages before discovery of a defendant's financial informa-
tion may be undertaken," and "prescribed a hearing procedure to
be followed in situations in which hearings are deemed neces-
sary."19 The evidentiary hearing established, however, is not re-
quired in every case. 20 It is only necessary when plaintiff intends
to investigate defendant's net worth.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Despite assertions by defendant Congregation that the stan-
dard set forth in Palmisano entitles them to an evidentiary hear-
ing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that it was not the
court's intention that an evidentiary hearing was required in every
case where a plaintiff asserts a claim for punitive damages. 22 The
hearing was adopted as a balancing procedure and a plaintiff is
required to clear that hurdle only if he intends to investigate the
defendant's financial net worth during the pretrial discovery
stage.23 Similarly, if a defendant's financial worthiness were a
matter of public record or of some other obvious nature, a hearing
would also be deemed unnecessary. 24 In the instant case, the pre-
siding justice acted properly in denying defendant Congregation's
motion to strike and refusing to require a hearing to determine the
viability of plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 25 The supreme
court denied defendant Congregation's petition for certiorari,
17. Mark, 745 A.2d at 779-80 (quoting Palmisano, 624 A.2d at 318).
18. See id. at 780
19. Id. (citing Palmisano, 624 A.2d at 320).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 781.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
20011 613
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quashed the previously issued writ and affirmed the order of the
superior court.26
CONCLUSION
In Mark v. Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reiterated that the procedure created in Palmisano
requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of entitlement
to punitive damages applies only when a plaintiff has made a de-
mand for discovery of a defendant's financial condition. Addition-
ally, the holding set forth in Palmisano is confined to its specific
facts and will not be extended further.
Danielle T. Jenkins
26. See id.
